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The pogrom of 1905 in Odessa: a case study
Robert Weinberg

The wave of anti-Jewish pogroms that swept the Pale of Settlement
after Tsar Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto in I 905 reflected
the ethnic and political tensions and hostilities that characterized
popular unrest and marred the social landscape of late Imperial
Russia in that revolutionary year. 1 In the weeks following the
granting of fundamental civil rights and political liberties, pogroms
directed mainly atJews but also affecting students, intellectuals, and
other national minorities broke out in hundreds of cities, towns, and
villages, resulting in deaths and injuries to thousands of people. 2
In the port city of Odessa alone, the police reported that at least
400 Jews and roo non-Jews were killed and approximately 300
people, mostly Jews, were injured, with slightly over 1,600 Jewish
houses, apartments, and stores incurring damage. These official
figures undoubtedly underestimate the true extent of the damage, as
other informed sources indicate substantially higher numbers of
persons killed and injured. For example, Dmitri Neidhardt, City
Governor of Odessa during the pogrom and brother-in-law of the
future Prime Minister Peter Stolypin, estimated the number of
casualties at 2,500, and the Jewish newspaper Voskhod reported that
over 800 were killed and another several thousand were wounded.
Moreover, various hospitals and clinics reported treating at least 600
persons for injuries sustained during the pogrom. 3 Indeed, no other
city in the Russian Empire in 1905 experienced a pogrom
comparable in its destruction and violence to the one unleashed
against the Jews of Odessa.
Despite the havoc wreaked by these pogroms, historians have only
just begun to explore the origins, circumstances, and consequences of
the October pogroms in an effort to evaluate their impact and
connection with the general course of revolutionary events in r 905. 4
Even though the general contours of pogroms in Russia are known,
detailed case studies are nonetheless required if historians are to offer
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a more comprehensive and conclusive assessment of antisemitism
and the pogromist phenomenon in late Imperial Russia. This
chapter focuses on Odessa for several reasons. First, Odessa was the
fourth largest city in the Russian Empire by century's end, boasting
a Jewish populalion of approximately 138, oo in a city with 403,000
inhabitants. Second, Lhe op and breadth of the viol nc directed
against Odessa J wry merit special study. Third, since ethnicity
oft n acted as a divisive force in labor movements in many parts of
Western Europe and Russia during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the ethnic heterogeneity of the Odessa work
force provides an opportunity to study how ethnic and religious
antagonisms affected worker solidarity and the capacity for collective
action in I 905. 5 Finally, examination of the Odessa pogrom addresses
the broader issues of the Revolution of r 905, particularly the
character of worker unrest and protest and the dynamics of
revolutionary politics. The fact that the pogroms followed quickly on
the heels of major concessions offered by the autocracy strongly
ug ests that they were conn Cled to the political crisis ngulfing
Russia in r 905 and should th refore be examined in the ont xt of
the social, economic, and political strains threatening the stability of
state and society in late Imperial Russia.
Pogrom analysis raises two especially perplexing issues, namely
how to identify pogromists and their motives and how to pinpoint
the specific reasons for the outbreak and timing of pogroms. While
members of various social and occupational groups often engaged in
acts of anti-Jewish violence and behaved out of varying motives, is
it possible t det rmin whi h re ident f Od s a wer particularly
pron to pogromist beha ior in r905 nd why th y figured
pr min ntly in atta k onjew and their prop rty? Given the lon
heritag of anti ·emitism in des a t.hal in luded periodic oulbreaks
of violent attacks against Jews, why did anti-Jewish violence surface
only in the aftermath of the October Manifesto and not earlier in the
year during other instances of social and political unr st? The
0 tober pogrom in Odessa also underscores the importance of
studying popular and official attitudes towardJews and asse sing the
extent to which the pogrom was a spontan ous display of popular
antisemitism or the result of a carefully planned and premeditated
strategy engineered by government officials.
The October 1905 pogrom in Odessa resulted from the conjuncture of sev ral long-term and short-term social, economic, and
political factor that produced conditions in the autumn of r 905
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parti ularly rip for an explosi n of anti-Jewish violen . Among th
lo.ng-t rm fa ·tor wer economic comp tition between enain
ategories of Gentile and Jewish" ork rs - un killed day laborers in
parti ular - long-standing thni and religiou ancagonisms the
promin nee of J w in the commercial affair of Odessa and the
mistr atm nl ofJ ews as i.t was rnanife ted b the central go ernm nt
and lo a l autb ritie in discriminatory legislation and p lici . More
imm diate factors in Jude th gen ral our of p litical vents and
developments in 1 905, spe ifically th polarization of the poli ti al
p ctrum int pr a nd anti- overnment forces th role of ivilian
and military offi ial in promoting an atmo ph r condu iv to a
pogrom and the visible po ilion ofJ ws in th opposition mov ment
against the autocracy. An xamination of ir umstan e. leading up
to th p grom and an analy i f tb chain of events that trigg r d
th · attack n the J ws of tb city unders ore how the pogrom gr w
out of genera l developments in Odes a in 1905 and was an int gral
element in the trajectory of th r volu tion. The pogrom ·annot b
und rstood apart fr m th c mplex natur of so ial e onomi
thnic and p Iitical lif' in Odessa.
Founded in the waning years of the reign of Catherine the Great,
Odessa was a relatively new city that did not inhibit but rather
n ourag d a ll resid nts - Russians and non-Russian , for ign rs
a nd J ws - Lo participate a tiv ly in its economi d velopm nt.
dessa was an nlight ned ity that tolerated diversity and
innovation welcoming p rson of all nationalities " ho ould
contribute to the growth of the city. Greeks, Italians, and Jews
helped set the tempo of commercial and financial life .in Odessa and
assumed a tive role in th ity' ultural and politi a l affairs during
mu h of th nin te nlh c · ntury. J w wer especially welcome in
Ode a and were exempt from many of the onerous burdens and
restrictions that coreligionists in other areas of the Pale of Settlement
endured.
But this tol ranc did not m an lhatJews in Od ssa were a cepted
a so ial equa ls or that antisemitism did not exist in lhe ity.
Notwithstanding Od ssa s w II-d es rved r putation a a ba lion of
Jib ral and en light ned attitudes t ward it J wish resident the
J ews of d ssa wer no trangers lo anti-Jewish animo ity, ' hich
g nerally remained ubm r d but did as ume ugly and iolent
form ev ral times before 1905. Seriou. pogrom· in which Jew wer
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killed and wounded and Jewish houses and businesses suffered
substantial damage had occurred in 1821, 1859, 1871, 1881, and
1900. Anti-Jewish sentiment was common among Odessa's Russian
population, a gangs ofJe\ ish and Russian youths ft n ngaged in
bloody brawl . Every year at Eastertime rum r of an imp nding
pogrom circulat d through the city's J wi h community. Pogrommongering intensified aft r the turn of the century as militantly
patl'i.otic and pro-tsarisl organizati n emerged and engaged inJewbaiting and other ant..isemiti acliviti s. 6
These pogroms stemmed in part from deep-rooted anti-Jewish
feelings and reflected a Judeophobia prevalent among many nonJ wish re idents of the city. Such was the case in the 182 1 pogrom
when Greeks attacked Jews, accusing them of aiding the Turks in
killing the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople. After mid-century,
however, religious fanaticism and hatred sometimes mixed with
social and economic factors to heighten anti-Jewish sentiments. The
increasing prominence ofJews in the commercial life of the city and
structural changes in the economy played no small role in fueling
antisemitism and leading to its expression in pogroms.
Until the Crimean War, Greeks controlled the export of grain from
Odessa, while Jews dominated the roles of middleman and expediter.
With the disruption of trade routes caused by the war, many of the
leading Greek commercial firms either went bankrupt or decided to
pursue other more lucrative ntures.Jewish m rchants and traders,
who were accu tomed to op rating at small · r pr fit margins, filled
the vacuum caused by the departure of Greek merchants and
assumed prominent positions in the export business in Odessa, which
was overwhelmingly dependent on the grain trade. Like other ethnic
and religious communities in the city, Jewish merchants gave
preference in employment pra tices to their oreligionists. Consequently, Greeks were supplanted by Jewish work r and fell into
straitened economic circumstances. 7 These developments, along
with rumors of a Jewish ritual murder in 1859 and desecration of the
Greek Orthodox Church and cemetery in I 871, fanned the flames of
antisemitism, driving many Greeks, sailors and dockworkers in
particular, to participate in pogroms in these years.
Greeks were not the only residents of Odessa who perceived Jews
as an economic threat. Russian resentment and hostility toward Jews
came to the fore in the pogrom of I 871 as Russians joined Greeks in
attacks on Jews. Thereafter, Russians filled the ranks of pogromist
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mobs m 1881, 1900, and 1905. The replacement of Greeks by
Russians as pogromists reflects the decline of Greek influence in
Odessa and underscores the tension and hostility that also existed
between Russians and Jews in the city. 8
According to some Russian inhabitants, exploitation by and
competition with Jews figured prominently as the causes of the I 871
pogrom. Some insisted that "the Jews exploit us," while others,
especially the unemployed, blamed increased Jewish settlement in
Odessa for reduced employment opportunities and lower wages.
One Russian cabdriver, referring to the Jews' practice of lending
money. to Jewish immigrants to enable them to rent or buy a horse
and cab, com plained : " Several years ago there was one Jewish
cabdriver for every 100 Russian cabdrivers, but since then rich Jews
have given money to the poor Jews so that there are now a countless
multitude of Jewish cabdrivers." 9
The growing visibility of Jews enhanced the predisposition of
Russians to blame Jews for their difficulties. Like elsewhere in Russia
and Western Europe, many non-Jews in Odessa perceived Jews as
possessing an inordinate amount of wealth, power, and influence
and pointed to the steady growth of the city's Jewish population
during the nineteenth century - from approximately 14,000 ( 14
percent) in 1858 to nearly 140,000 (35 percent) in 1897 - as an
indication oftheJewish "threat." 10 The increasingly prominent role
played by Jews in the commercial and industrial life of the city after
mid-century also contributed to resentment against Odessa's Jewish
community. In the 1880s, for example, firms owned by Jews
controlled 70 percent of the export trade in grain, and Jewish
brokerage houses handled over half the city's entire export trade.
Jewish domination of the grain trade continued to expand during
the next several decades; by I g Io Jewish firms handled nearly go
percent of the export trade in grain products. In addition to their
activities as merchants, middlemen, and exporters, Jews in Odessa
by century's end also occupied prominent positions in the manufacturing, banking, and retail sectors. In I g IO Jews owned slightly
over half the large stores, trading firms, and small shops. Thirteen of
the eighteen banks operating in Odessa had Jewish board members
and directors, while at the turn of the century Jews comprised
approximately half the members of the city's three merchant guilds,
up from 38 percent in the mid- I 88os. Jews virtually monopolized the
production of starch, refined sugar, tin goods, chemicals, and
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wallpaper and competed with Russian and foreign entrepreneurs in
the making of flour, cigarettes, beer, wine, leather, cork, and iron
products. Even though Jews in 1887 owned 35 percent of all
factories, these firms produced 57 percent of the total factory output
(in roubles) for that year.
Despite the outstanding success of some Jews in economic pursuits,
the common perception that the growing Jewish presence threatened
to result in total Jewish domination had little basis in reality. The
proportion of Jews in the city's population, which had risen from
about a quarter to a third during the last quarter of the century,
leveled out after 1897, with the percentage of Jews somewhat
dropping by the eve of 1905. According to data assembled by the city
governor, the number of Jews living in Odessa in 1904 was
approximately 140,000, or just over 28 percent of the city's total
population. The reasons for this decline are difficult to ascertain but
may be due to imprecise census-taking by local officials, since other
studies state that the percentage of Jews in Odessa still remained
above 30 percent in 1904.11 Regardless of slight variations in
estimates of the size of the Odessa Jewish community at the turn of
the century, non-Jews continued to hold their own in the economic
sphere and were in no danger of being eliminated by Jewish
entrepreneurs and industrialists. According to the l 897 census,
thousands of Russians and Ukrainians were engaged in commercial
activities of some sort, especially the marketing of agricultural
products, and comprised approximately a third of the total number
of individuals listed as earning livings from trade. Moreover, on the
eve of 1905 approximately half the licenses granting permission to
engage in commercial and industrial pursuits were given to nonJews, and in l9IO non-Jews owned slightly under half the large stores
and trading firms and 44 percent of small shops. Forty percent of
manufacturing enterprises in l 887 were owned by foreigners, with
Russians owning another 25 percent. On the eve of the First World
War foreigners and Russians, many of whom employed primarily
Russian workers, owned the majority of enterprises under factory
inspection in Odessa. Lastly, Jews in l9IO owned only I7 percent of
real estate parcels in the city, down from 20 percent a decade earlier,
while Gentiles controlled about half of all large commercial
enterprises. The bulk of the wealth in Odessa still remained in the
hands of non-Jews. 12
Furthermore, wealthy Jews could not enter the leisured propertied
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class or translate their wealth into political influence and power.
Contrary to popular perceptions prevalent among non-Jews in both
Odessa and throughout Russia, Odessa was not controlled by its
Jewish residents. Only a handful of Odessa's Jews lived from
investments in land, stocks, and bonds, and even fewer - 71 in a staff
of 3,449 - worked for the imperial government, the judiciary, or the
municipal administration. This was due in part to the 1892
municipal reform which made it more difficult for Jews to occupy
government posts and disenfranchised RussianJewry, who no longer
enjoyed the right to elect representatives to city councils. A special
office for municipal affairs was assigned the responsibility of
appointing six Jewish members to the sixty-man Odessa city
council. 13
In contrast to the wealthy and influential stratum of Jews, which
never constituted more than a fraction of the total Jewish population
of Odessa, the vast majority of Jews eked out meager livings as
shopkeepers, second-hand dealers, salesclerks, petty traders, domestic servants, day laborers, workshop employees, and factory hands.
Poverty was a way oflife for most Jews in Odessa, as it undoubtedly
was for most non-Jewish residents. Isidor Brodovskii, in his study of
Jewish poverty in Odessa at the turn of the century, estimated that
nearly 50,000 Jews were destitute and another 30,000 were povertystricken. In 1905 nearly 80,000 Jews requested financial assistance
from the Jewish community in order to buy matzoh during Passover,
a telling sign that well over half the Jews in Odessa experienced
difficulties making ends meet. 14
Despite the disparity between popular perception and the reality
ofJewish wealth and power, a reversal in Odessa's economic fortunes
at the turn of the century strengthened anti-Jewish sentiments
among its Russian residents. Russia entered a deep recession as the
great industrial spurt of the 189os faltered. In turn, Odessa's
economy suffered a setback due to the decrease in the demand for
manufactured goods, the drop in the supply of grain available for
export, and the drying up of credit. Weaknesses and deficiencies in
Odessa's economic infrastructure complicated matters. Conditions
continued to deteriorate as the year 1905 approached, due to the
outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904. Trade, the
mainstay of Odessa's economy, declined even further and the city's
industrial sector entered a period of retrenchment. 15
Although anti-Jewish sentiments in Odessa usually remained
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submerged, many residents feared that Russian-] ewish hostilities
could explode in a matter of hours given the right combination of
factors. During major labor demonstrations or strikes, organizers
often felt compelled to exhort workers not to direct their anger at
Jews, but to present a united front of Jew and Russian against
employers. More important, organizers had to allay fears among the
general public that demonstrations and strikes might develop into
pogroms. As one Russian worker assured the Odessa Jewish
community in early l 905, Russian workers were not "wild animals
ready to unleash a pogrom." 16 The fear that strikes and demonstrations would degenerate into antisemitic violence even served to
curb labor militancy. For example, the 1903 May Day rally never
materialized because many potential participants, Jews and Russians
alike with the memory of the recent Kishinev pogrom fresh in their
minds, feared that a march through Odessa would spark a pogrom.
In fact, a group ofJewish shopkeepers and property owners, upset by
workers gathering in a field to celebrate May Day, informed the
police, who arrested some thirty workers.17 Employers also understood that religious animosities could be used to hinder worker
solidarity; owners of the few enterprises with ethnically mixed labor
forces sometimes encouraged Russian workers to direct their anger
at Jewish coworkers.18 Ethnic loyalties and hatreds of Russian
workers sometimes overshadowed their affinities to Jewish workers
based on the common exploitation and oppression both groups
experienced as wage laborers and permitted ethnic tensions to
surface.
During the first half of 1905 tensions between Jews and Russians ran
particularly high. Fomented in part by the popular belief that Jews
were not contributing to the war effort against the Japanese, antiJ ewish hostility nearly reached a breaking point in the spring. 19 As
in previous years rumors of an impending pogrom circulated among
the Jewish community during Orthodox Holy Week in April. Yet
unlike the past, when Jews did not take precautions, in 1905 they
mobilized.
Building upon the self-defense groups they had formed in the
aftermath of the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, Odessa's Jews armed
themselves and issued appeals, calling upon the non-Jewish residents
of Odessa to show restraint and not engage in violence against Jews.
Just before Easter the National Committee of Jewish Self-Defense
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distributed a series of leaflets threa tening non-Jews with armed
retaliation in th even t of a pogrom. Th committee urged aJI J w
to JOln lf-d fl nse brigad · and prepare to counter an y atta k n
Jews and bcir property. M n wer told to arm them Iv s with
guns, knives, clubs, and whips, and women were encouraged to
prepare solutions of sulfuric acid. Bundists, Bolsheviks, and Mensheviks joined in these efforts by also reorganizing self-defense
brigades established the year before and taking up collections for
weapons and ammunition. Despite the circulation of pogromist
literature inciting Russians to attack Jews, local officials and a
Bundist correspondent concluded that ru mors of a pogrom were
unfounded . In fact, the Bund's corr sp nd nt wrote that "a
pogrcmist mood was ... unnoticeable." 20
Yet fear of an impending pogrom resurfaced in June in the
aftermath of a general strike and disorders occasioned by the arrival
of the battleship Potemkin. On r 3 June Cossacks shot several workers
from metalworking and machine-construction factories who had
b "n on ·trike ·in Lh beginning f May. \ 1 orkers r t liated on r4
June by ·ngaging in ma si e work loppa es and attacking th
po lie · \ i th guns and ro ks but the arrival of the Potemkin th a t night
div"rtt:d the worker from furth r c nfrontation with th ir mploy t
a n th· gov mm nl. n 15 Jun in ·t ad of intensifying the ·trik,
thousa nd· of d ssan jammed Lh port di.strict in ord r to view the
battleship and rally behind the mutinous sailors. By late afternoon
some m~embers of the crowd began to ransack warehouses and set fire
to the harbor's wooden buildings. Although available sources do not
allow a precise determination of the composition of the rioters,
partial arre· t re ords r veal that non-Jewi. h vagrants (Liudi be;;,
opredelcmiyk!t zaniatii) dockworkers, and olher d ay la b r 1 comprised
the majority. To uppr
the unrest, th miUtary ·ordon d off the
harbor and opened fire on the trapp d crowd. By the next morning
well over r ,ooo people had died, victims of either the soldiers' bullets
or the fire which consumed the harbor. 21
During the. disorders rumors of an impending pogrom once
again surfa d , as right-wing agitators attempted to incite Russian
workers against the Jews. 22 On 20 June, only a few days after the
massacre, a virulently antisemitic, four-page broadside entitled
Od sskie dni app ar d . h tracl blam. d the Jews, in particular th
a tional Committ of J ewi h
lf- Defi n and second a ry school
·tucl cn t.s, r. r ti r ent disord r a nd the tragedy at th port.
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Accusing the Jews of fomenting the unrest and enlisting the support
of unwitting Russians, the author of the broadside stated that Jews
initiated the shootings on 14 and r 5 June and were responsible for
setting fire to the port. The tract ended with a call to hold the Jewish
community of Odessa collectively responsible for the destruction and
demanded that Jews compensa te Gentiles who suffered p'roperty
damage and personal loss. In addition, Odesskie dni called for the
disarming of all Jews and suggested a general search of all Jewish
apartments in the city. Failure to carry out these proposals, the trnct
concluded, would make it "impossible for Christians to live in
Odessa" and result in the take-over of Odessa by Jews. 23
While Odesskie dni did not call for acts of anti-Jewish violence, its
appearance underscores the tense atmosphere existing in Odessa and
highlights how in times of social unrest and political crisis ethnic
hostility could come to the fore and threaten further disruption of
social calm. In the week or so following the massive disorders of midJune, scattered attacks against Jews were reported as antisemitic
agitators tried to stir up Gentiles into a pogromist mood. 24 Moreover,
the belief that Jews were responsible for the June unrest was evident
in the report-s of some government officials. Gendarme chiefKuzubov
wrote that the instigators of the disorders and arson were
"exclusively Jews" and Count Aleksei lgnatiev, in his report on the
disorders in Kherson and Ekaterinoslav provinces, also accused Jews
of setting fire to the port but did not furnish any hard evidence or
substantiation. 25 Though no pogrom occurred in June, the sentiments expressed in both Odesskie dni and official reports indicate the
emotionally charged atmosphere of Russian-Jewish relations in
Odessa and the extent to which government officials, who in their
search for simple explanations and unwillingness to dig deeper into
the root causes of the social and political turmoil engulfing Odessa,
were prepared to affix blame to the Jews.
Jews found it difficult to dispel the accusations expressed in
Odesskie dni. While many reports of Jewish revolutionary activity
were exaggerations or even fabrications, Jews were behind some though certainly not all - of the unrest in Odessa. During the
summer the police arrested several Jews for making and stockpiling
bombs. Jews also figured prominently among the 133 Social
Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries either considered politically unreliable, arrested or exiled after the June Days. In
addition, a leaflet distributed throughout the city, apparently by a
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Plate 8. Group portrait of the Odessa Bund self-defense group, posing with
victims of the 1905 pogrom at the cemetery. The banner, in Yiddish and
Russian, reads: "Glory to those who have fallen in the struggle for freedom!"

Plate 9. Members of the Odessa Bund killed in the pogrom of 1905

The pogrom of 1905 in Odessa

Bundist organization, urged Jews to arm themselves, struggle for
civil and political freedom, and overthrow the autocracy. 26 Jews also
helped organize rallies at the university and direct student strikes
and public demonstrations. Like others throughout the Empire,
Odessa's university became the locus of anti-government activity
after August when the Tsar granted administrative autonomy to
Russia's universities, thereby removing these institutions from the
jurisdiction of the police. Jewish youths, students, and workers filled
the ranks of the crowds that attended the rallies at the university in
September and October, and Jews actively participated in the wave
of work stoppages, demonstrations, and street disorders that broke
out in mid-October. On 16 October, a day of major disturbances,
197 of the 214 persons arrested wereJews. 27 Moreover, Jews eagerly
celebrated the political concessions granted in the October Manifesto, seeing them as the first step in the civil and political
emancipation of Russian Jewry.
These events confirmed many high-ranking police and other
officials in the beliefthatJews were a seditious element. As we have
seen, many government officials blamed Jews for the June unrest. In
doing so they were following a tradition of accusing Jews for
fomenting trouble in Odessa. At the turn of the century, for example,
the city governor even asked the Ministry of the Interior to limit
Jewish migration to Odessa in the hope that such a measure would
weaken the revolutionary movement. 28 Such attitudes, along with
the legacy of discrimination against Russian Jewry and governmental tolerance and at times sponsorship of anti-Jewish organizations and propaganda, signaled to antisemites that authorities in
Odessa would probably countenance violence againstJews. 29 When
combined with economic resentments and frustrations as well as
timeworn religious prejudices, the perception that Jews were
revolutionaries provided fertile ground for a pogrom. To those
residents of Odessa alarmed by the opposition to the Tsar and
government, Jews were a convenient target for retaliation.
Politics in Odessa polarized during 1905 as anti and progovernment forces coalesced and mobilized. Militant right-wing
organizations like the Black Hundreds and patriotic student groups
consolidated their ranks, and radical student groups emerged as
significant political forces, joining the organized revolutionary
parties already active in Odessa. Indeed, the stage was set for
confrontation between the forces of revolution and reaction and the
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pogrom occurred in the context of this unrest and Odessa's feverish
atmosphere. During the week before the October pogrom, public
calm was disturbed by bloody confrontations pitting the populace
against soldiers and police. The crucial question is why this unrest
degenerated into one of the worst anti-Jewish progroms ever
experienced in imperial Russia.
On r 5 October, a day after the police injured several high school
students who were boycotting classes in sympathy with striking
railway workers, radical students and revolutionaries appealed to
workers to start a general strike. They collected donations for guns
and ammunition and representatives of the city's three Social
Democratic organizations visited factories and workshops. Reports
also circulated that students and revolutionaries were forming
armed militias. On r6 October students, youths, and workers
roamed the streets of Odessa, building barricades and engaging the
police and military in pitched battles. The troops summoned to
suppress the demonstrations encountered fierce resistance, as
demonstrators behind the barricades greeted them with rocks and
gunfire. Military patrols were also targets of snipers. The troops
retaliated by opening fire , and by early evening the army had
secured the streets of Odessa. The police disarmed and arrested
scores of demonstrators, systematically bludgeoning some into
unconsciousness. 30
The 17th of October passed without any public disturbances or
confrontations, but life did not return to normal. The military
continued to patrol the city, schools and many stores remained
closed and, even though not all workers responded to the appeal for
a general strike, at least 4,000 workers - many of whom were Jewish
- walked off their jobs either voluntarily or after receiving threats
from other workers already on strike. Groups of workers congregated
outside stores that opened for business, singing songs and drinking
vodka. At the university, professors and students, along with
representatives of revolutionary parties, redoubled efforts to form
armed militias. 31
The storm broke on r8 October. News of the October Manifesto
had reached Odessa officials the previous evening and by the next
morning thousands of people thronged the streets to celebrate. As
one university student exclaimed, "a joyous crowd appeared in the
streets - people greeted each other as if it were a holiday." 32 Jews,
hoping that the concessions would lead to the end of all legal
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disabilities against them, were joined by non-Jews in vigorously and
enthusiastically celebrating the granting of civil and political
liberties.
At first the crowds were peaceful, but the quiet did not last long.
Soon after the demonstrations began, several individuals began to
unfurl red flags and banners with anti-government slogans. Others
shouted slogans like "Down with the Autocracy," "Long Live
Freedom" and "Down with the Police." Apartment dwellers
draped red carpets and shawls from their balconies and windows,
while groups of arrogant demonstrators forced passersby to doff their
hats or bow before the flags. In the city council building,
demonstrators ripped down the portrait of the Tsar, substituted a
red flag for the imperial colors and collected money for weapons.
The city governor also reported that one group of demonstrators tied
portraits of Nicholas II to the tails of dogs and then released them
to run through the city. 33 The mood of the demonstrators grew more
violent as the day wore on. Groups of celebrants - primarily Jewish
youths according to official accounts - viciously attacked and
disarmed policemen. By mid-afternoon the office of the civil governor
had received reports that two policemen had been killed, ten
wounded and twenty-two disarmed, and that many others had
abandoned their posts in order to avoid possible injury. 34
The clashes were not limited to attacks on policemen by angry
demonstrators. Toward the end of the day tensions between those
Odessans who heralded the Manifesto and those who disapproved of
the concessions granted by Nicholas had reached a breaking point.
Angered over being forced to doff their caps and outraged by the
sight of desecrated portraits of the Tsar, supporters of the monarchy
gave vent to their anger and frustration. They demonstrated their
hostility not by attacking other Russians celebrating in the streets,
but by turning on Jews, for they viewed them as the source of
Russia's current problems. Clashes occurred throughout the day as
groups of armed demonstrators, chiefly Jewish students and workers,
scuffled with bands of Russians. These outbreaks of violence marked
the beginning of the infamous pogrom and were the culmination of
trends that had been unfolding in the city for several weeks.
Armed confrontations between Jews and Russians originated near
the Jewish district ofMoldavanka in the afternoon and early evening
of r8 October. The clashes apparently started when a group ofJews
carrying red flags to celebrate the October Manifesto attempted to
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on ince a group of Ru sian work rs l() doff th ir ap Lo the fl, ·s.
Har h word were x hanged, as uffle n u d and lhen h t rang
out. Bol.h gr ups s att red, bu l qui kl y r s mbl d in nearby tr ets
and r umed fighting. Th lashe oon turned into an anti-.J wi ·h
J"iot, a Ru sian indiscriminately atta k d .J w and b gan l
vandal.izc and lo t Jewi h homes apartm nl and stor · in th
neighborho cl. Th riot r aJ
lurncd n p li m n and troops
ummoned lo quell the di ord r a tions suggesting that pogr mi ts
wer not yet fuUy focused on J w in th ir atta k . Th miiilary n
ctob r 18 was equa ll y igilant in it fforts t r ·train both Ru ·sian
and Jewish rioters, vigorously suppressing these disturbances and
restoring order by early evening. Four Russians were killed, dozens
of Russians wounded - including policemen - and twelve Russians
arrested as a result of the unrest. The number of Jews who were
injured or arrested is unknown. 35
he pogrom b gan in full for e lh n xl day, 19 0 tob r. In lh
mid-morning hundreds of Russians - childr n worn n and m n rath red in various parts of lh 'ty for patrioli mar h to di play
their loyalty to th Tsar. Day labor r , pe ially th
mploy cl al
the do ks, ompris d a maj rel m nt of th rov d that a s mbl cl
at the harbor and were joined by Russian factory and construction
w rk rs, shopkeepers, salesclerks, workshop employees, other day
laborers and vagrants. 36
h e patrioti p roc ssions had the earmarks of a rally organiz d
by cxtr m , ri hl-wing political organization · lik th Bia k
Hundr ds. The main contingent of mar h r assembled al ustom
quar at the harbor, wh r th proces ion organiz r di tributed
flags, icon and portraits ol th T ar. Th mar h rs passed around
bottle · or vodka, and plainclotb s policem n rep rt dly handed out
n t onJy vodka but al o mon y and gun .37 nlo k 1 and pa . r by
joined the proc i n a th demon trator mad · lh ir way from the
p rt to th ity enter. in 'in th nation.al anth m and r ligiou
hymn and a corclin · to om reports, shouting "D wn with th
J ew ' and 'It's necessary to beat th m " lhey lopp d at th ity
ounci l bu ildfog and substituted th imp rial col r for lh red flag
thal demonstrator had rai ·d th previ us day. They then h aded
t \ ard th alh dral lo at din central Ode sa stopping en route at
the r -sid n s of Neidhardt and Baron Al ksanclr Kaulbars
ommander of th Od ssa Military Distri t. Kau lbar-, fi aring
onfron talion belw n th patrioti mar h r and left-wing students
and r volutionaric a ked them to disperse. om h dee! hi
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request, but most members of the procession continued their march.
Neidhardt, on the other hand, greeted the patriots enthusiastically
and urged them to hold their memorial service at the cathedral.
After a brief prayer service, the procession continued to march
through the streets of central Odessa. 38
Suddenly, shots rang out and a young boy carrying an icon lay
dead. Most accounts of the incident assert that the shots came from
surrounding buildings, probably from the offices of luzhnoe obo;::,renie.
No one knows for certain who fired first, but evidence strongly
suggests that revolutionaries or members of Jewish and student selfdefense brigades were responsible. 39 In any case, the crowd panicked
and ran through the streets as more shots were fired from rooftops,
balconies, and apartment windows, prompting some to plead for
police protection. Revolutionaries and self-defense units organized
by students and Jews threw homemade bombs at the Russian
demonstrators. These actions suggest that they, along with progovernment forces, were itchy for confrontation and ready to
instigate trouble. The shootings 'triggered a chain reaction:
convinced that Jews were responsible for the shootings, members of
the patriotic demonstration began to shout "Beat the Yids" and
"Death to the Yids" and went on a rampage, attacking Jews and
destroying Jewish apartments, homes, and stores.
The course of events was similar in other parts of the city, as
members of student and Jewish self-defense units fired on other
Russians holding patriotic services and provoked similar pogromist
responses. However, in Peresyp, a heavily Russian working-class
district where no patriotic procession took place, the pogrom started
only after pogromists from the city center arrived and began to incite
local residents. By mid-afternoon a full-fledged pogrom had
developed and it raged until 22 October. 40
The lurid details of the pogrom can be found in several eyewitness
and secondary accounts. Although the list of atrocities perpetrated
against the Jews is too long to recount here, suffice it to say that
pogromists brutally and indiscriminately beat, mutilated, and
murdered defenseless Jewish men, women, and children. They
hurled Jews out of windows, raped and cut open the stomachs of
pregnant women, and slaughtered infants in front of their parents.
In one particularly gruesome incident, pogromists hung a woman
upside down by her legs and arranged the bodies of her six dead
children on the floor below. 41
The pogrom's unrestrained violent and destructive excesses were
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in large m asur mad · pos ible by the failure of authorities to adopt
any count rm a ures. Low-ranking policemen and soldiers failed to
interfer w ith the pogromi ·t and in many instan s parti ·pated in
the lo ting and killing. At times, poli men, e king L av nge the
attacks of r6 and 18 ctober on th ir oil a u , ' ent
far as to
prote tion for pogromists b firing on th
lf-defl ns uni ts
by J w , tud 1Jts and revolu tionaries. For th ir part,
soldi r concluding from the a tion of th polic that th e pogr m
was san tioncd by high r au horiti , stood idJ b)' whit · po romists
looted stor
and murd red unarm d J ws. S me policeme
di barged their weapons into th air and told rioters that th . hots
had come from apartments inhabited by Jews, leaving the latter
vulnerable to vicious beatings and murder.
yewitnesses also
reported seeing policemen directing pogromists to Jewish-owned
tor or Jew apartment whil te r.i 1 the rioters away from the
prop rty of non-J ws. As the correspondent fi r Collier' reported
"Ikon and crosses w re pla d in ' indows and hung outsid doors
to mark the re idences of the Ru sian and in a lmost very ca e this
wa a sufficient protection. Indeed, Otlesskii pogrom i samoobm·o11a ,
an emotional a count of the ctober trag dy publi h d by Lab ·
Zionists in Paris, argues that th p Ii e more than any th er group
in Od ssa were respon ibl for th deaLh and pillage.'12
Th viden e indi ate Lhat p lie m n act d (or failed to act) witb
th knowledge aod tacit approval of th eir sup rior .
ith ·
Neidhardt nor Kaulbar took any deci iv action to suppr . s th ·
pogrom when disorders erupted. In fa ' t, the h ad of Lh
dessa
gendarmes admitt d that the military d id not apply sufficient en rgy
to end th pogrom and stated that pogromist gr eted ldicr and
policemen with shouts of "Hurrah" and then
nt.inued th .ir
rampage and pillage without interference. 43 It was not until 21
October that Kaulbars publicly announced that his troops were
under orders to shoot at pogromists as well as self-defensists. Until
then soldiers and police had shot only at self-defensists. Whether the
2 1 0 tobcr dir ctive ord ring troop to sho t at pogromi ts help d
to restore order i uncl ar. While it is diffi ult to di ount ntireJy the
eftect of the directive particularly since the pogrom peter d oul the
next day, it bears noting that the return to alm may hav be'n du
more to the exhau tion of th pogromist mob than to any mili ary
dir ctiv and action. Y t il is a lso important to 'tr · that .vhen the
military did act to stop public disorders, as they did on 18 October
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and again on 21 and 22 October, pogromists generally did desist and
disperse. Considering that the pogrom ended on 22 October, one
cannot help but conclude that more immediate and effective action
by the military could have prevented the pogrom from assuming
such monstrous dimensions.
Kaulbars, defending his inaction before a delegation of city
councillors on 22 October, stated that he could not take more
decisive measures since Neidhardt had not made a formal determination that armed force be used to stem the disorders. Relevant
regulations permitted civil authorities to request the assistance of
military units when the police concluded that they were unable to
maintain control; the prerogative to determine whether force should
be employed resided with the city governor, but once he made such
a decision, then the military commander assumed independent
control until the end of operations. 44 Thus, Kaul bars believed that
he lacked authorization to deploy his troops against the pogroms
since Neidhardt had not followed procedure, a conclusion also
reached by Senator Aleksandr Kuzminskii, head of the official
government inquiry into the pogrom.
Kaulbars discounted reports that his troops were participating in
the disorders, terming them unfounded and unsubstantiated rumors.
He issued his directive only after Neidhardt visited him on 20
October and reiterated a request made on I g October to adopt
measures to prevent the outbreak of a pogrom. More importantly,
the fact that the 2 1 October order was signed by chief-of-staff
Lieutenant-General Bezradetskii and only issued by Kaulbars's
office strongly suggests that the military commander was compelled
by his superiors to suppress the pogrom. Neidhardt and Kaulbars
defended their individual actions (or inactions) and bitterly accused
each other of dereliction of duty, claiming the other was responsible
for maintaining order. The sad truth of the matter is that police and
troops were in a position to act but failed to due to the absence of
instructions, rendering irrelevant the claims of Neidhardt and
Kaulbars that the other possessed authority to suppress the
pogrom. 45 Consequently, pogromists enjoyed almost two full days of
unrestrained destruction.
Senator Kuzminskii castigated the city governor for withdrawing
all police from their posts in the early afternoon on I 8 October, an
action he believed to warrant criminal investigation. The reasons for
Neidhardt's action are unclear, since his reports are contradictory
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and conflict with accounts of other informed police officials and
civilian leaders. Neidhardt claimed that he was seeking to protect
the lives of policemen who were subject to attack by celebrants of the
Manifesto, but close examination of the testimony indicates that the
bulk of attacks on policemen occurred after they were removed from
their posts. Indeed, many had abandoned their posts before trouble
erupted. Nonetheless, the possibility remains that the city governor
was acting to protect his men, since several of them had been
victimized prior to his directive. Having removed policemen from
their posts, Neidhardt instructed them to patrol the city in groups.
Strong evidence also suggests that Neidhardt tacitly approved the
student militias and hoped they could maintain order in Odessa in
the absence of the police. 46 Kuzminskii concluded that Neidhardt
was guilty of dereliction of duty because he had left Odessa
defenseless by not ordering the police patrols to take vigorous action
to prevent trouble and suppress the disorders.47 The absence of
police ready to maintain law and order on r8 and rg October made
for an explosive situation, signifying the surrender of the city to
armed bands of pogromists and self-defensists.
Both Neidhardt and Kaulbars defended the behavior of the police
and military. Referring to the intensity of the shooting and bombing,
the city governor and military commander argued that attacks by
student and Jewish militias hampered efforts of policemen and
soldiers to contain the pogrom. They also accused self-defense
brigades of shooting not only at pogromists, but also at police,
soldiers, and Cossacks. The police and military, according to
Neidhardt and Kaulbars, had to contend first with the self-defense
groups before turning their attention to the pogromists. 48 Konstantin
Prisnenko, commander of an infantry brigade, supported Neidhardt
and Kaulbars when he told Kuzminskii that "it was hard to stop
pogromshchiki because the soldiers were diverted by revolutionaries
who were shooting at them." 49
The police and military undoubtedly were targets of civilian
militias and were rightly concerned about their safety and security.
Yet as the pogrom gathered momentum, one can hardly blame
members of self-defense brigades for shooting at soldiers and
policemen, for many of them were actively participating in the
violence. Moreover, Neidhardt and Kaulbars acted as though
civilian militias were the only groups involved in the violence,
conveniently ignoring how the actions of policemen and soldiers
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after the pogrom began were provocative and might compel Jews to
defend themselves. Despite Neidhardt's 19 October request to
Kaulbars to help forestall disorders, it was not until the pogrom was
in full swing that any official made an effort to stop it. Neither
Neidhardt nor Kaulbars gave immediate orders to their staffs to
subdue pogromists and restore order. Had the police and military
genuinely applied their energies to halting the pogrom, the need for
self-defense would have been reduced and attacks on soldiers and
policemen would have dropped accordingly. The explanations
offered by Neidhardt and Kaulbars were self-serving attempts to
shift the blame for the failure of the police and military to perform
their basic law enforcement functions to the victims of the pogrom.
How then are we to explain the outbreak of the pogrom? Was any
one individual or group responsible for conceiving and directing the
pogrom or was the orgy of violence against Jews spontaneous in
origin and execution? Like many government officials, Kuzminskii
concluded that the Odessa pogrom was a spontaneous display of
outrage against the Jews whose political activity had elicited the
pogromist response. Despite his criticism of Neidhardt, Kuzminskii
joined the city governor, Kaulbars, and other authorities in Odessa
in blaming the pogrom on its victims, since the Jews played a visible
role in the revolutionary movement and events of 1905. Such
tortuous reasoning dated back to the 1880s when government
apologists seeking to explain the pogroms of 1881 argued that Jews,
not pogromists, bore responsibility for anti-Jewish violence. 50 Unlike
previous pogroms, which Kuzminskii attributed to national hatred
and economic exploitation, the October disorders occurred as a
result of the scandalous public behavior of Odessa's Jews, especially
after the announcement of the October Manifesto. Okhrana chief
Bobrov, for example, concluded that Jews were responsible for
provoking pogromist attacks because they were spearheading a
revolutionary attack on the autocracy in an effort to establish their
"own tsardom." For government officials, then, patriotic Russians
were justified in seeking punishment of Jews for such treasonous
behavior as desecrating portraits of the Tsar and forcing bystanders
to pay tribute to revolutionary flags. They could also point to the
stockpiling of weapons and medical supplies at the university and the
organization of student militias in the days immediately before the
issuance of the October Manifesto as evidence of a revolutionary
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conspiracy to overthrow the government. Fears that Jews were
prepared to use the concessions of the manifesto as a springboard for
the subjugation of non-Jews created a situation fraught with
frightening prospects. Kuzminskii defined the pogrom as an offshoot
of the patriotic procession and blamed its excesses on the failure of
Neidhardt to adopt adequate countermeasures. 51
The legacy of discrimination against Russian Jewry and governmental tolerance and at times sponsorship of anti-Jewish organizations and propaganda provided fertile ground for a pogrom. 5 2
When combined with economic resentments and frustrations,
timeworn religious prejudices and the political polarization of
Odessa society during 1905, the beliefthatJews were revolutionaries
and fears that they were prepared to use the concessions of the
manifesto as a springboard for the subjugation of non-Jews helped to
create a situation fraught with frightening prospects. To those
residents of Odessa alarmed by the opposition to the Tsar and
government, Jews were a convenient and obvious target for
retaliation.
It is questionable, however, whether the pogrom was purely
spontaneous. Even though the work of Hans Rogger and HeinzDietrich Lowe has done much to absolve many high-ranking
government ministers and officials in St. Petersburg of engineering
the pogroms and giving a signal to mark their start, the culpability
of certain local officials is less easy to dismiss. 53 The staPdard view of
the Odessa pogrom places much of the blame on the encouragement
and connivance of local officials, though not all the sources agree on
whether the police and military actually planned the pogrom. Many
contemporaries blamed civilian and military authorities, especially
Neidhardt, for fostering a pogromist atmosphere and not taking
measures to suppress the pogrom. Members of the city council and
the newspaper Odesskie novosti, for example, placed full responsibility
for the bloodletting on Neidhardt by stressing that his decision to
remove the police from their posts gave free reign to pogromists. and
Khronika evreiskoi z:.hiz:.ni called for a judicial investigation in order to
reveal the city governor's "criminal responsibility. " 54
Kuzminskii himself collected evidence that points to the involvement of low-ranking members of the police force in the
planning and organization of the patriotic counter-demonstration
and pogrom. He stopped short, however, of suggesting that either
Neidhardt or other local civil and police officials planned the
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pogrom. According to the testimony of L. D. Teplitskii, an ensign
in the army, as early as 15 and r6 October policemen were proposing
to use force against Jews as punishment for their role in instigating
the current wave of strikes and disorders in Odessa. As one
policeman told Teplitskii, "Jews want freedom - well, we'll kill two
or three thousand. Then they'll know what freedom is." Teplitskii
also testified to meeting a group of day laborers on the morning of
r 8 October who told him they had just received instructions at a
police station to attack Jews that evening. 56 In working-class
neighborhoods policemen and pogromist agitators went from door to
door, spreading rumors thatJews were slaughtering Russian families
and urging Russian residents to repel the Jews with force. Policemen
reportedly compiled lists of Jewish-owned stores and Jews' apartments to facilitate attacks, and one Jewish newspaper reported that
documents existed revealing how plainclothes policemen paid
pogromists from 80 kopecks to 3 roubles per day upon instructions
of their superiors. 57 Other evidence even suggests that policemen
were instructed not to interfere with pogromists. An army captain
informed Kuzminskii that a policeman had told him that his
superiors had given their permission for three days of violence
because Jews had destroyed the Tsar's portrait in the city council. 58
Unfortunately, no evidence has surfaced indicating which police
officials were responsible for these directives. Nor is there conclusive
evidence linking Neidhardt to the planning and approval of the
pogrom or even pogrom agitation. Considering Neidhardt's efforts
prior to October to avert unrest and disorders through patient
negotiation and timely compromise with workers and employers, it
would have been out of character for him to have approved, let alone
planned, a major public disturbance. We have already seen how he
behaved when rumors of a pogrom circulated earlier in the spring.
Like most government officials entrusted with the responsibility of
maintaining law and order, Neidhardt possessed a strong disciplinarian streak and would have been hesitant to sanction any kind
of public unrest for fear of events getting out of hand. 59 To be sure,
Neidhardt knew about the patriotic procession and even welcomed
it, but this does not warrant the conclusion drawn by many Odessa
residents that the city governor had advance knowledge of the
pogrom. In fact, Neidhardt so feared an emption of violence on r g
October that he requested Kaulbars to withdraw permission for a
funeral procession planned for that day to commemorate the
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students killed on r6 October in order to avoid confrontation
between funeral marchers and the patriotic counter--demonstration.
He also called upon the military commander to adopt measures to
prevent the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence. 60 The quickness with
which the authorities cooperated on October r6 to suppress street
disorders clearly suggests that Neidhardt and Kaul bars were
genuinely trying to prevent a serious breach of social peace.
Yet questions remain. Why were the police and military derelict
in their duty once the pogrom began? What accounts for Kaulbars's
failure to order his troops, who were in position, to restore order?
Why did Neidhardt not prevent individual policemen from
participating in the looting and pillaging and wait until 2 r October
before ordering his staff back to work? And how can we explain his
failure to request vigorous action by the military as well as his callous
refusal to heed the pleas of pogrom victims, including a rabbi and
bank director, who begged him to intercede ?61 The truth of the
matter may simply have been that Neidhardt had few options.
Individual policemen were already abandoning their posts even
before he issued his directive of r 8 October and civilian attacks had
begun. Furthermore, the police refused to return to their posts on 2 r
October, despite the city governor's order to do so. Neidhardt may
have realized that he could not depend on a severely underpaid,
understaffed, and disgruntled police force to maintain order in the
city. The Odessa police, like most municipal police forces throughout
the Empire, not only had a long-standing reputation for corruption
but, unlike many others, often failed to obey orders and directives.
Neidhardt was aware of the low morale among his police force,
attributing it to low wages and inadequate training. 62 The city
governor may also have realized that he could no longer control the
actions of most members of the police force and turned to Kaul bars
for help only after the pogrom had reached such dimensions that it
became clear that student self-defense brigades were an ineffective
check on the violence and destruction. Another possible scenario is
that he may simply have reasoned that the police and military were
powerless to control the pogromist mobs in light of their failure to
contain popular unrest earlier that week.
His sense of helplessness notwithstanding, Neidhart's behavior
certainly was not blameless, and there is no doubt that his sympathies
lay with the pogromists. He was a virulent antisemite who, in the
midst of the pogrom, reportedly told a delegation of Jewish leaders,
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"You wanted freedom. Well, now you're getting 'Jewish freedom '." 63 From Neidhardt's perspective, Jews were responsible for
the disorders and the pogrom was retribution. Thus, although
Neidhardt did not plan the pogrom or even, it would seem, possess
prior knowledge of it, he generally sympathized with the actions of
pogromists and may have viewed attacks on Jews, once he realized
that he was unable to prevent them, as an effective method of
squelching the revolution. Neidhardt's actions, then, support in a
very limited and modified way the notion that officials hoped
pogroms would deflect popular resentment from the government.
However, in the case of the Odessa pogrom, the anti-Jewish violence
was not the result of plotting by high-ranking local authorities: the
willingness of Neidhardt as well as Kaul bars to tolerate the pogrom
and delay ordering their men into action evidently occurred after the
violence erupted but nonetheless underscores their culpability and
negligence.
Kaulbars also shares the burden of responsibility for not acting
more promptly to restore order. The military commander, who was
curiously not censured by Kuzminskii, was derelict in the performance of his duty since his troops were already in position to act
against pogromists. Despite confusion over whether he or Neidhardt
possessed jurisdiction to issue orders to stem the disorders, Kaul bars
certainly had the authority to order his men to subdue the
pogromists, especially since Neidhardt had requested on the rgth
that he take measures to prevent a pogrom. Thus, Kaulbars's
defense that he could not interfere in "civilian administration" since
Neidhardt had not explicitly determined that armed force was
needed to restore order is a feeble excuse for his lack of action and
direction, as was the mud-slinging, so evident in Kuzminskii's final
report, between Kaulbars and Neidhardt over who possessed
authority to suppress the pogromists.
Kaulbars not only ignored reports that his troops were participating in the pogrom and waited several days before ordering them
to combat pogromists, but he even remarked to an assembly of
Odessa policemen on 2 r October that "all of us sympathize in our
souls with the pogrom." Yet Kaulbars, who somewhat later openly
patronized and even supplied arms to the right-wing Union of
Russian People, tempered his remarks by acknowledging that
neither his personal sympathies nor those of policemen and soldiers
relieved them of the responsibility to maintain law and order. 64 This
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conflict between personal val·ues and offici.::.l duty, betwc•.'X• sympathy
for the pogromists and obliga.tion to preserve :wcia.l pea[:c, helps tQ
account for the failure of Kaulbars and Neidhard t to act more
decisively. Undoubtedly tlH'Y were galled at the prospect of ordering
their men to interfere with tbe pogromists, who, in their eyes, were.
the only loyal subjects of a!: :ocracy in Odessa. How can one jll3tify
shooting defenders of the T~ar and the autocratic order? Such logic
and attitudes led both men t;' be derelict in their duties to preserv-;~
law and order and suppre':' the pogromist mobs.
Kuzminskii was essentiall~ correct to explain the timing of the
pogrom in terms of the pc:i1ical crisis facing th e regime in O ctober
1905. But politics alone ,fo not explain the motives of many
pogromists. Aside from th•.': pr;lice, who were the other participa.E ~"
in the pogrom and why did they join the police in viciously attacking
Jews? While not discoun' ing the impact of political events jn
triggering the pogrom, certain social and economic characte1·istics Gf
life in Odessa also must be c:rnsidered in a complete account of the
pogrom.
Available sources do r:. ·1 t ailow a precise determination of the
composition of the pogrnmi ~ t crowds, but they do reveal that
unskilled, non-Jewish da)' laborers, more th a n any o th (;r group
(including the police), fill {': d the ranks of the mobs which attacked
Jews and destroyed property. Since these workers 'Nere especially
prone to anti-Jewish violeiKe and, as we have already seen, playc::.1
a significant role not only in the patriotic processi on but in other
popular disorders earlier in the year as well, a closer exa rninatirm of
their lives might provide insight into their rnotives.
Day laborers in Odes8a led a precarious social and economic
existence, suffering from irregular impermanent -work and. lo11v
wages. Many were unmarrie d male migrants to Odessa who lacked
marketable skills and work experience. Large numbers of thes<'. day
laborers came from the countryside, where rural poverty and
overpopulation were driving rnany young peasants to the cities in
search of work. Other day workers were Jews who moved to Odes:;a
in order to escape the des~i tntion of life in th e shtetlekh and sn10Jl
towns of the Pale of Settlement.
Competition for employrr.rnt between J ewish ar:: d gentile day
laborers assumed special io :vJ; ta.nce at docksicl es and in th e railw2.y
depots, where thousands of unskilled workers vied for employment
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during the peak season of commercial activity, which began in
spring and lasted well into the autumn. According to the 1897
census, slightly over 16,ooo workers were unskilled day laborers
without permanent jobs and specific occupations, but who supplemented the city's sizable work force of dockworkers, porters, and
carters during the busy season. Precise data do not exist, but most
estimates of the number of dockworkers in Odessa at the turn of the
century range from 4,000 to 7,ooo, with one estimate placing the
number of dockworkers at 20,000. Approximately half these workers
were Jews and close to w,ooo other Jews found employment as
unskilled laborers elsewhere in the city by century's end. 65
Even during peak periods of port activity, operators of shipping
lines, brokerage firms, and warehouses did not require the services of
all dockworkers looking for work. In the summer few dockworkers
worked more than fifteen days a month; job competition acquired
even larger dimensions during the off-season or periods of slump and
recession, when over half of all dockworkers were unemployed. It is
estimated that between 1900 and 1903 at least 2,000 dockworkers
were unemployed at any given time 66 • More specifically, unemployment for longshoremen increased dramatically in the late
18gos and early 1goos when the labor market began to constrict as
a result of crop failures, economic recession, the Russo-Japanese
War, and Odessa's declining share of the export trade in grain. The
last factor was due in part to the failure of Odessa to keep pace with
the more modern and better-equipped harbors of other port cities in
southern Russia. The use of conveyor belts at docksides, first
introduced on a limited basis in the 1870s to facilitate port
operations, reduced employment opportunities for stevedores and
exerted downward pressures on wages by the century's end. The
constricting labor market heightened job competition between
Jewish and Gentile dockworkers, culminating in 1906 and 1907 with
shipowners, city authorities, and longshoremen setting up a hiring
system that established quotas for the number of Jewish and nonJ ewish dockworkers. Evidence exists indicating that tensions among
dockworkers of different nationalities - primarily between Russians
and Jews, but to a lesser extent also a mong Russians, Georgians, and
Turks - influenced the d cision to establish this quota system. 67
Some day workers belonged to work gangs or artels which were
either hired by subcontractors on a regular basis or employed
directly by the shipping lines. Each company generally used the

274

ROBERT WEINBERG

services of different work gangs, whose members were hired by the
month or day. Yet the vast majority of day laborers lacked
permanent work, a situation that the hiring process made even more
difficult. In order to work on a given day, day laborers not belonging
to work gangs placed their names on sign-up sheets that subcontractors for shipping lines and import-export firms posted at
different taverns throughout the city. The prospects of finding work
in this manner were slim, however. Prospective laborers had to
arrive between 2 and 3 am in order to ensure themselves a place on
the lists, and those fortunate to find employment for a day had to
give the subcontractor approximately a third of their earnings,
leaving them with barely a rouble to take home. According to 1904
data, day laborers earned an average daily wage of 60 kopecks to a
rouble. After a long day's work, they returned to await payment at
the tavern where their subcontractor conducted business; settling up
often took until r o pm 68 Given the extraordinary number of wasted
hours, it is not surprising that many day laborers lacked the
inclination to work every day. Even if they so desired, competition
from other job seekers reduced their chances of finding work.
Although some day laborers lived in apartments with their
families or other workers, many found their wages inadequate to rent
a room or even a corner in an apartment and were forced to seek
shelter in one of the crowded flophouses (nochlezhnye dorna) that
speckled the harbor area and poor neighborhoods of Odessa. At the
turn of the century several thousand people - mostly Great Russian
by nationality - slept in flophouses, with a sizable majority of them
living in such accommodations for over a year and nearly half for
over three years. In other words, many day laborers had become
permanent denizens of night shelters. Indeed, many frequented the
same flophouses day after day and even had their favorite sleeping
corners. 69
Conditions in the night shelters were abominable. Night shelters
were breeding grounds for infectious diseases and offered the lodger
only a filthy straw mattress on a cold, damp, and hard asphalt
floor. 70 Often they lacked heat and washing facilities. Their patrons
usually bathed in a canal filled with the warm, runoff water from the
municipal electric plant, since no public baths existed in the port
district. 71 Of the nine night shelters located in the harbor district,
seven were privately owned and two were operated by the city.
Conditions in the city-run shelters were better than those found in
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privately owned flophouses, since city shelters generally provided
bathing facilities and free medical care and operated cafeterias. In
addition, the city ran a day shelter that attracted daily up to 500
persons who took advantage of its showers, kitchen, and lending
library. 72
Alcoholism was another contributing factor in the entry of day
workers into the world of flophouses. As one twenty-year-old
explained, he began sleeping in night shelters" because of vodka." 73
Contemporary observers often characterized residents of flophouses
as lacking the resolve to lift themselves out of these degrading
surroundings. Like many other workers, they drowned their sorrows
in drink. Observers also commented that many day laborers worked
only in order to earn enough money to get drunk. The system of
subcontracting encouraged heavy drinking since it invariably took
place in taverns. 74 Drinking not only diminished the chances of
finding work, but also robbed day workers of the motivation to work
on a permanent basis. Consequently, many of them could not
disengage themselves from the crippling world of vodka and were
content to work one or two days a week, spending the rest of the
week drinking. As one observer noted: "Hope has died in their
hearts - apathy has replaced it. " 75
Dependent on the activity of the port for their livelihood, day
laborers in general and dockworkers in particular were usually the
first workers to feel the impact of downturns in the economy. During
such times, lacking even the few kopecks that night shelters charged,
they often slept under the night-time sky or in open barrels at
dockside. 76 Hunger was such a constant factor in the day laborers'
lives that they used a broad range of colorful phrases to express its
intensity. For example, "simple hunger" (gekoklzt prostoi ) referred to
hunger caused by not eating for one day. "Deadly hunger" (gekoklzt
smertel' nyi) lasted somewhat longer, and "hunger with a vengeance"
(gekoklzt s raspiatiem) was of "indeterminate length, whole weeks,
months, in short, hunger which has no foreseeable end. " 77
Many day laborers never established secure family and social
roots and were never fully integrated into urban, working-class life.
Even though many had lived in Odessa for years, their lives had a
marginal and rootless quality. The faces of their workmates,
employers, and those who slept near them in the night shelter
changed frequently, even daily, and the lack offulltime employment
and permanent lodgings limited their opportunities to form
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friendships and establish bonds either at home or at work. Even for
day laborers who enjoyed the comforts and security of steady work
through membership in a work gang and apartment living, life in
Odessa had an ephemeral quality, since many of them were seasonal
migrants who never settled permanently in Odessa. Day laborers
found it difficult though not impossible under such circumstances to
promote and defend their interests in an organized and sustained
manner.
Observers referred to day laborers as "p ac ful and b lieved
that the "day laborer is not terrifying when h ' had his fill; when
the port is busy, this Odessan is calm. 78 This omm nt's implication
is clear, however: day laborers could be less than law-abiding and
peaceful during times of economic hardship. An under u1T nt of
tension and discontent was clearly visible among day laborers, and
there were times when they gave ent to their frustrations and anger
in fits of rage and fury. At the bei ht of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900,
for example, r enlful that soldiers were assigned the task of loading
ships de tined for the Far East, day laborers reacted to their
displacement by attacking J ws and stores owned by both Jews and
Gentile . 79 In 1905 day laborers exploded twice, first in June, when
Jews were not singled out as targets of their wrath, and th n a ain
in October, this time however with anti-Jewish violence r aching
alarming proportions. Quite clearly, lhen day laborers did not
follow a preordained path that inevitably led to pogromist actions,
and their occupation and so ial characteristics lack foolproof
predi tive values of behavior. Day laborers did not always direct
their ir towardJews; om times they channeled their anger toward
those possessing wealth and property regardless of ethnic or religious
background. Day laborers did not consistently follow a conservative
pro-government line. To be sure, members of the Moscow Customs
Artel took part in the patrioti proces ion and pogromi t violence,
but they also were caught up in the movement to challeng
employers for improved working conditions. For instance, in May
several hundred of them conducted an ord rly and successful trike
for higher wages and shorter workdays, and in November they again
struck over low pay, hours, hou ing allowance, and the right to select
deputies who would b empowered to have final say in the levying
of fines. This labor activism continued into 1906. 80 It took a
conjuncture of certain social, economic, and political factors to
transform a riot into an anti-Jewish pogrom.
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In Odessa pogromist behavior had both an ethnic and a class basis
that reflected the complex relationship of long-term ethnic antagonisms, the structure of Odessa's economy, and short-term political
catalysts. The heritage of antisemitism made Odessa particularly
ripe for a pogrom: the legal disabilities and mistreatment endured
by the Jews of Russia engendered an attitude that accepted
antisemitism and tolerated anti-Jewish violence. The domination of
the grain trade by Jewish merchants predisposed many dockworkers
against Jews, whom they conveniently saw as the source of the
troubles, particularly the lack of jobs, besetting the city and
themselves. Consequently, when day laborers sought an outlet for
their frustrations and problems, they focused on Jews. Without
taking into account the hostile, anti-Jewish atmosphere in Odessa,
we cannot understand why Russian day laborers at times of
economic distress chose not to attack other Russian workers who
competed with them for scarce jobs or Russian employers, but
instead indiscriminately lashed out at all Jews, regardless of whether
they were job competitors.
Similarly, the depressed state of the Odessa economy also helped
set the stage for the outbreak of the pogrom. The straitened
economic circumstances of 1905 produced a situation especially ripe
for anti-Jewish violence. Many day laborers were out of work and,
owing to their lack of skills, unlikely to find employment.
Unemployment and economic competition contributed to a growing
sense of frustration and despair among many pogromists and helped
channel their anger against Jews. Yet economic problems alone do
not explain why Russian day workers decided to attack Jews in
October 1905. In June, for example, dockworkers and day laborers
exploded in a fit of wanton rage, but chose to challenge established
authority by destroying the harbor. In October these same workers
directed their hostility and frustration toward Jews, although
material conditions had not substantially changed.
What had changed since the June disorders was the political
atmosphere which had become polarized and more radicalized. The
heated revolutionary climate of mid-October precipitated the
pogrom. Many participants in the patriotic procession of I 9 October,
especially members of the Black Hundreds and other organized
right-wing groups, undoubtedly marched in order to express their
support of the autocracy and disapproval of the October Manifesto.
They even tried to recruit other Odessans, particularly day laborers
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and dockworkers, by appealing to age-old fears and suspicions that
Jews threatened the purity of Russian Orthodoxy and contaminated
the social fabric. Some workers, as one Social Democratic activist
speaking about the labor movement in r 903 stated, feared that
"they would be replaced by Jews and be left without work" in the
vent ofpoliti a l r volution. 1 And still others undoubtedly second d
th
pinion or on Odessan who aid the 18 ctob r c 1 brations
brought "tear to his eye ' a h regarded lh m a insulting and
disgrac ful. 82
Y t many lh r
and do kworker in parti ular,
w r le s nti d by politi s than by the v dka and mon y that tbe
poli e reportedly oflered.
rtainly not aU m mb 1 f th pro ssion
and pogromi t n 'Cessaril y lood n th extrem r.ighl of the political
p trum, as the d kwo1·k rs and day labor rs' riot in Jun strongly
suggests. For th politicall apathetic and unawar , th lruagJ
b tween revolution and rea tion wh.i h inspir d lhe more p liti ally
consciou played a
ondary if not n gHgibJ rol . Many may not
hav intended l a ault J ews and d stroy th ir property but w r
prov ked by the sho tin and bomb-throwing of th r v lutionarie
and elf-def.en e brigad . Th
a tions help to explain the irulenc
and intensity of th pogromi t allack - especiall y by th police - on
their vi tim . Th y w r imply aught up in th gen ral tenor of
events and, while not being dupes or pawns manipulated by Black
Hundred agitators, found themselves attacking Jews and their
property in much the same way that they destroyed the harbor in
June. In fact, pogromists looted drinking establishments, after which
Lh y indis riminately tra hed non-Jewi h h uses, ther by demonstratin £hat popu lar iolencc was not a lway dir t d against
Jews, even in the mid t of a pogrom. 83 Thee po romi ts wer not
a ting wiLh the mali of foreth ught but re ponding to immediate
events Lhat channeled their anger and ire again t the J w . till
th rs may have w I omed the pogrom b cause it afford d them the
opportunity to vent some steam and, perhaps, acquire some booty.
Thus, whatever the specific motivations of the various individuals
involved in the pogrom, popular and official antisemitism and
depressed
onomi circumstan es set Lh tage by providing th
n e sary psychological and rnaterial pre onditions, while th
ho thou political atm pber of Odessa in 1905 h lped trigger the
pogrom. Violen
flen la ked political import and significan e and
s rved th cau e of r> olutioo or ounter-r volution onJy wh n it
appeared in conjunction with ther fa tor .
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By no means did all Russian workers participate or even
sympathize with the bloodletting. Many Russian workers enlisted in
self-defense units, while others sheltered their Jewish neighbors and
friends during the terror. For example, members of the sailors' union
armed themselves and patrolled the harbor to protect Jewish
property. After the pogrom Russian self-defensists provided financial
aid to pogrom victims and took vigorous action to punish pogromists
and ensure that another round of anti-Jewish violence would not
occur. 84 Significantly, many of the Russian self-defensists were
skilled workers from the same metalworking and machine-construction plants that supplied the workers active in the organization
of strikes and the formation of district and city strike committees,
trade unions and, in December, the Odessa Soviet of Workers'
Deputies.
Two reasons can be adduced to explain the reluctance of these
workers to join ranks with pogromists. First, skilled metalworkers
and machinists did not face serious employment competition with
Jews, who rarely worked in these industries. Despite the fact that
Jews comprised a third of Odessa's population, Jews and Russians
rarely worked in the same factory or workshop, or even as members
of the same work gang at the dockside. In fact, Jews and Russians
were generally not employed in the same branch of industry. The
exception, as we have seen, was unskilled day labor. Most factory
workers were Russians and Ukrainians; Jews formed a small
minority. One estimate placed the number of Jews employed in
factory production at between 4,000 and 5,000 with most working as
unskilled and semi-skilled operatives in cork, tobacco, match, and
candy factories. 85
In addition, many of the factories employing skilled workers had
a history of labor activism and a tradition of political organization
and awareness. As I van Avdeev, a Bolshevik organizer in the railway
workshops, told a meeting of his co-workers, the railway workshops
formed a self-defense group during the pogrom to demonstrate that
"the Russian worker values civil freedom and liberty and does not
become a Black Hundred or a hooligan. On the contrary, he is
capable of not only protecting his own interests but those of other
citizens." 86 One Menshevik concluded that the pogrom and other
outbursts of anti-Jewish violence was part of the government's effort
to stem the tide of revolution by enlisting the support of" the wild,
dark, ignorant masses of the dregs of society ... the hungry throngs of
bosiaki." 87 Workers in the railway repair shops and the Henn
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agricultural tool and machinery plant organized self-defense groups
and both enterprises had a long heritage of labor radicalism and a
close association with Zubatovism and Social Democracy. The
presence of political organizers and propagandists may have muted
the anti-Jewish sentiment of the Russian workers in these plants and
imparted an appreciation of working-class solidarity that transcended ethnic and religious divisions.
To sum up, the social composition of the work force helped
determine the form and content of popular unrest. At one end of the
occupational spectrum stood the unskilled day laborers who were
wont to engage in campaigns of violence and destruction. At the
other end were the skilled, more economically secure Russian
metalworkers and machinists who tended not to participate in the
pogrom and were more inclined than the unskilled to channel their
protest and discontent in an organized fashion. Even though skilled
and unskilled workers in Odessa frequently resorted to violence as a
way to achieve their objectives, they used violence differen tly. The
violence and public disorder that often accompanied strikes by
skilled workers, as in June, could radicalize the participants and pose
a revolutionary threat. But worker militance and social unrest also
had reactionary consequences when Jews became the object of the
workers' outrage and hostility . It is a commonplace that the most
politically milita nt and radical of workers in both Western Europe
and Russia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were generally not found among the poorest and most disadvantaged
segments of the work force. Yet the unskilled and least integrated
workers were very prone to violence - p erhaps to a much greater
extent than the better skilled and politically aware and mobilized
workers - and this violence could contribute to or impede the
revolutionary cause. In June a riot by the unskilled posed a serious
threat to the authorities, but in October protest by these same
workers effectively undercut the force and power of the revolution.
The pogrom served the cause of political reaction and counterrevolution by revealing how a potentially revolutionary situation
could be defused quickly when the target of the workers' wrath was
no longer a symbol of the autocracy. The October 1905 pogrom in
Odessa illustrates how ethnic hostility was a potent force in workers'
politics and served as a centrifugal force that diminished the capacity
of Odessa workers to act in a unified fashion. The pogrom defused
the revolutionary movement in Odessa by dampening the workers'
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militancy, and despite a resurgence oflabor unrest in December, the
fear of more bloodletting dissuaded workers fro m vigorously
challenging their employers and the government like workers in
Moscow.
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